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ABSTRACT 
 
Are Older Workers Worthy of Their Pay? An Empirical 
Investigation of Age-Productivity and Age-Wage Nexuses* 
 
Using longitudinal employer-employee data spanning over a 22-year period, we compare 
age-wage and age-productivity profiles and find that productivity increases until the age 
range of 50-54, whereas wages peak around the age 40-44. At younger ages, wages 
increase in line with productivity gains but as prime-age approaches, wage increases lag 
behind productivity gains. As a result, older workers are, in fact, worthy of their pay, in the 
sense that their contribution to firm-level productivity exceeds their contribution to the wage 
bill. On the methodological side, we note that failure to account for the endogenous nature of 
the regressors in the estimation of the wage and productivity equations biases the results 
towards a pattern consistent with underpayment followed by overpayment type of policies. 
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1 Introduction
The increasingly larger share of total population accounted for by older individuals
—aging— is a key component of world population trends since the mid-twentieth
century. This aging process is now pervasive and accelerating.
Concerns over its economic consequences have focused on the growing burden
on social security systems around the world arising from the persistent decline of
the potential support ratio. A less researched but potentially equally important
consequence of this aging process concerns labor productivity, as the labor force is
also becoming older and that may further impact on growth prospects, depending
on how labor productivity varies with the age of the worker.
Individual productivity depends on the workers’ abilities (physical and cog-
nitive), as well as on their education and experience. While experience tends to
increase with age, workers’ abilities are expected to decline as individuals get older.
Avolio and Waldman (1994) place around 30 the age at which cognitive and phys-
ical abilities start to decline sharply, whereas Skirbekk (2003) sets at around 50
the age at which productivity starts to decline.1 The decline in the productivity of
labor with the age of the worker has been documented by a number of authors for
speciﬁc occupations.2 However, as noted by Galenson and Weinberg (2000), the
threshold at which productivity starts to decline may itself be subject to change
over time, due to the changing nature of output demand and technology, as well
as to the observed trend in the amount of job-training provided and the rate of
training obsolescence (Bartel and Sicherman, 1993).
The fact that there is an important collective dimension to labor productivity
(Aubert and Cre´pon, 2003) opens the way to analyzing the age-productivity nexus
at the ﬁrm level rather than at the worker individual level. Results obtained with
ﬁrm level data indicate that a larger share of old workers has a detrimental eﬀect
on ﬁrm productivity (Haltiwanger, Lane and Spletzer, 1999, Lallemand and Rycx,
2009), which is consistent with the ﬁndings obtained at the worker level.
The studies referred so far have concentrated only on the productivity side.
None of them embraces a direct comparison of the productivity and wage proﬁles,
to test whether the age-wage slope is steeper than the age-productivity slope. An
early exception to this is oﬀered by the work of Medoﬀ and Abraham (1980),
1For a review of the literature on the evolution of cognitive skills over the life-cycle, see Skirbekk (2003).
2These include academia (McDowell, 1982, Diamond, 1986, and Oster and Hamermesh, 1988) or track and
ﬁeld road racing (Fair, 1994).
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who document a positive association, within hierarchical grade level, between pay
and experience, not related or even negatively related to individual performance
on the job (as rated by the supervisors). Their results are interpreted as ev-
idence against the human capital on-the-job training model and are consistent
with Lazear’s model of deferred compensation (Lazear, 1979), which postulates
that a pay scheme whereby workers are underpaid at the earliest stages of their
careers within ﬁrms and overpaid later on is an admissible solution to the moral
hazard problem the employer faces in a context of imperfect information on work-
ers’ actions.
The ﬁrst study to focus entirely on wage and productivity age proﬁles was
Hellerstein and Neumark’s (1995). They have initiated a new track in the lit-
erature by proposing a simple but thoughtful method to test whether wage dif-
ferentials traditionally captured by wage regressions are rooted in productivity
diﬀerentials captured by production functions. The procedure relies on linked
employer-employee data and consists essentially on estimating a production func-
tion and a wage function at the plant level, using a common speciﬁcation, and
then comparing the estimated coeﬃcients across equations. Using ﬁrm level data
from Israel, they estimate Cobb-Douglas production functions augmented with the
inclusion of the shares of workers in the young, prime-age and older age brackets,
ﬁnding that the upward sloping age-wage proﬁle mirrors the upward sloping age-
productivity proﬁle. Similar results were obtained by Hellerstein, Neumark and
Troske (1999), while Hægeland and Klette (1999) found that the wage premium
for workers with higher experience (more than 15 years) exceeds their relative pro-
ductivity, whereas the opposite is true for workers with 8 to 15 years of experience.
Both the representativeness and the validity of these results are currently sub-
ject to intense debate. The need to ground the empirical work on longitudinal data
so as to control more eﬀectively for the relevant ﬁrm characteristics (including un-
observed time-invariant characteristics) is now widely agreed upon (Hellerstein,
Neumark and Troske, 1999). Firm-productivity shocks (which are, by deﬁnition,
time-varying and therefore not captured by ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects or similar methods)
might as well bias the results, because ﬁrms may have more diﬃculty adjusting
some types of labor than others due, for example, to the adoption of inverse senior-
ity rules. In such cases, the bias in the estimation of older workers’ productivity
would arise out of the fact that changes in input shares are endogenous. Attempts
to overcome this problem include using Arellano and Bond’s (1991) estimator
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(Aubert and Cre´pon, 2003, Go¨bel and Zwick, 2009 and van Ours and Stoeldraijer,
2010) and two-stage regression methods (Dostie, 2006).3
In this article we also test the hypothesis that older workers are ”overpaid”, by
comparing the contribution of diﬀerent demographic groups to both the ﬁrm sales
(which we take as a proxy for production) and its wage bill. Our work relies on
administrative longitudinal data on workers and their ﬁrms of remarkable quality,
which cover the entire workforce in the manufacturing and services private sector
in Portugal. Problems commonly faced by panel datasets, such as panel attrition
and over- or under-sampling of some groups of workers, are not present. Given
its administrative nature and the fact that workers within each plant can have
access to all the information reported, measurement problems are also reduced.
Our analysis spans an unusually long period of more than twenty years.
Given the high quality of our database we believe that our results provide more
reliable and precise estimates than previous studies. Indeed, all previous research
on this topic is based on cross-sectional data or on panel data shorter than the
length of the age intervals considered in the analysis. Hence, identiﬁcation of
the eﬀects of age on wages and productivity depends on either cross-sectional
variation or, for panel data studies, mostly on turnover of workers. In this latter
case the scope to observe existing workers aging is reduced over a short period of
time during which relatively few workers ”cross the border” of the age brackets.
Because we have data spanning 22 years and use 5-year age brackets, we are
in a better position to capture aging of the ﬁrms’ workforce and are thus able
to obtain estimates of the parameters of interest based on within-ﬁrm variation
largely due to the aging of each ﬁrm’s workforce. The precision of our estimates is
enhanced by the fact that we are able to introduce detailed information on worker
characteristics, particularly the education level. We also note that our results are
obtained from data that span over diﬀerent stages of the business cycle and cannot
be attributed to the timing of observation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
presents the models under estimation. Section 4 discusses the results and section
5 concludes.
3Aubert and Cre´pon (2003) estimate ﬁrst-diﬀerenced production and labor cost functions, treating the input
levels and input shares as endogenous and using lagged values of those variables as instruments. Go¨bel and Zwick
(2009) and Van Ours and Stoeldraijer (2010) also use an instrumental variable approach, estimating production
and wage equations in ﬁrst diﬀerences and using lagged values of the age structure as instrument for the change
in the age structure. Dostie (2006) estimates productivity shocks in the ﬁrst step and uses them as regressors to
estimate the productivity equation in the second step.
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2 Data source and descriptive statistics
The data were gathered annually, between 1986 and 2008,4 by the Ministry of
Employment in Portugal, in an inquiry that every plant with wage earners is
legally obliged to ﬁll in (Quadros de Pessoal). Information on all the personnel
working for the plant in a reference week is reported. Public administration and
domestic service are not covered; the coverage of agriculture is low, given its low
share of wage earners. For the remaining sectors, the mandatory nature of the
survey leads to an extremely high response rate and in practice the population of
ﬁrms with wage earners in manufacturing and the services private sector is covered.
Each ﬁrm entering the database is assigned a unique identiﬁcation code and it
can thus be followed over time. Reported data include the ﬁrm’s location, industry,
employment, sales, ownership of equity capital (national, foreign, or public), and
the worker’s gender, age, schooling, occupation, seniority within the ﬁrm, monthly
earnings (split into several components), and duration of work. Sales for year t
are reported in year t + 1.
As in Haltiwanger et al. (1999) we measure productivity as total sales per labor
unit. Although this is common in the literature,5 we recognize that total output
(or valued added) would be a more accurate measure of productivity. The choice of
sales for the computation of productivity was dictated by data availability. We also
lack information on capital stock. This may be of less concern given that Foster
et al. (2001) showed that labor productivity and total factor productivity are
closely associated. In the same line, Dostie (2006) found that the age-productivity
diﬀerentials were virtually identical if the model was estimated with and without
controlling for the capital stock.
The fact that sales are reported the following year requires dropping the data on
2008 (the ﬁnal year). Also, for ﬁrms that run out of business, the ﬁnal observation
must be discarded and if a ﬁrm fails to report in one particular year, data on
the previous year will not be considered in our analysis (a constraint that led to
dropping 13% of the ﬁrm observations in the initial dataset). Sales outliers6, a
negligible share of the dataset (0.1%), have also been dropped.
Wage-earners tracked in the panel dataset with a valid identiﬁcation number,
aged 18 to 65 years, are considered in the analysis. Extensive checks have been
4Worker level data is not available for 1990 and 2001.
5Other examples are Auberg and Cre´pon (2003), and Hellerstein et al., (1999).
6Sales above 10 times the percentile 99 or below half the percentile 1.
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performed to guarantee the accuracy of the data, using the variables gender, date
of birth and highest schooling level achieved. Wage outliers have been dropped.7
Firms in manufacturing and services have been kept for analysis, thus dropping
ﬁrms in agriculture, ﬁshing, mining and construction industries (10% of the initial
dataset). Only ﬁrms with more than 5 workers in the conditions speciﬁed above
throughout the period under analysis have been kept. Given the small ﬁrm size
structure in the Portuguese economy, this led to further dropping 42% of the
observations ﬁrm-year in the original data set.
The ﬁnal data set includes over 300,000 observations ﬁrm-year on 41,815 ﬁrms.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Av. sales per labor hour (log) 3.495 1.212
Av. hourly wage (log) 1.383 0.447
Employment (log) 3.192 0.981
Age of the ﬁrm 25.163 16.469
Industry (food, bev. omitted)
textiles, clothing, leather 0.186
wood, cork, furniture 0.063
paper, printing 0.028
chemicals, rubber, plastic 0.030
other non-metallic mineral prod. 0.040
metals, machinery 0.102
other manuf. 0.007
trade, repairs 0.228
hotels, restaurants 0.070
transport, communication 0.037
ﬁnancial intermediation 0.011
real estate, serv. to co. 0.054
education 0.023
health, social serv. 0.043
sewage, refuse disposal 0.003
membership orgs. 0.007
recreational, cultural, sports activ. 0.008
other household, personal serv. 0.005
Ownership of capital (private omitted)
public 0.007
foreign 0.051
Lisbon 0.329
Share of workers aged 18-24 0.162 0.161
Share of workers aged 25-29 0.171 0.121
Share of workers aged 30-34 0.162 0.106
Share of workers aged 35-39 0.141 0.097
Share of workers aged 40-44 0.120 0.093
Share of workers aged 45-49 0.096 0.089
Share of workers aged 50-54 0.073 0.081
Share of workers aged 55-59 0.048 0.066
Share of workers aged 60-65 0.027 0.049
Share of workers w/ highest level university degree 0.057 0.128
Share of workers w/ highest level high-school degree 0.129 0.165
Share of workers w/ highest level 9 yrs education 0.145 0.147
Share of workers w/ highest level 6 yrs education 0.223 0.196
Continued on next page...
7Wages above 10 times the percentile 99 or below half the percentile 1.
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... table 1 continued
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Share of workers w/ highest level 4 yrs education 0.421 0.279
Share of female workers 0.453 0.323
Year
1987 0.040
1988 0.042
1989 0.041
1991 0.044
1992 0.044
1993 0.043
1994 0.045
1995 0.044
1996 0.044
1997 0.047
1998 0.048
1999 0.050
2000 0.051
2002 0.056
2003 0.058
2004 0.061
2005 0.064
2006 0.067
2007 0.069
N 301,328
3 Empirical model
Our empirical approach is based on the estimation of one ﬁrm-level wage equation
and one ﬁrm-level productivity equation that share a common speciﬁcation. The
aim is to compare across equations the estimates obtained for the coeﬃcients of
the same regressors, our primary interest being the coeﬃcients of the age-related
covariates.
The estimated ﬁrm-level average wage equation is:
ln(ωit) = α
ω + βωln(Lit) +
∑
j
γωj lj ,it + δ
ωXit + ε
ω
it, (1)
where subscript i denotes the ﬁrm, subscript t stands for time and subscript j
denotes labor types. ωit denotes the ﬁrm-level average hourly wage,
8 Lit is total
labor (as measured by the total number of employees at the ﬁrm), lj ,it is the share
of labor input j (e.g., workers with age j) and Xit is a vector of ﬁrm speciﬁc
characteristics.
The ﬁrm-level productivity equation is:
ln(qit) = α
q + βqln(Lit) +
∑
j
γqj lj ,it + δ
qXit + ε
q
it, (2)
8The monthly wage bill was computed for ﬁrm j at time t as Wjt =
∑
i
(bw + reg)ijt, where i refers to the
worker, bw stands for base-wage, and reg are other regularly paid components of the worker’s pay, all evaluated
in gross terms. Similarly, total hours refers to the sum of monthly hours reported for all workers in the ﬁrm.
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where qit is a measure of productivity (i.e., sales per yearly worker-hour
9), and
all other variables carry the exact same meaning as in the wage equation. All
monetary variables were deﬂated using the GDP deﬂator, base 2008.
As noted by Hægeland and Klette (1999) and Haltiwanger et al. (1999), these
two equations can be interpreted as simple descriptive equations with no behav-
ioral content. Both simply relate average wage and productivity levels to ﬁrm
characteristics and the composition of its workforce. However, as also noted by
Hægeland and Klette (1999), the wage equation is the ﬁrm-level equivalent of the
standard wage equation commonly estimated with worker data. Worker charac-
teristics usually controlled for in worker-level regressions show up as the share of
the corresponding type of labor at the ﬁrm level and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics,
such as size and age, show up untransformed.
Similarly, van Ours and Stoeldraijer (2010) show that the productivity equation
can be derived from a standard Cobb-Douglas production function augmented to
include controls for ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. Structural interpretation of the
productivity equation is possible under the assumption that workers of diﬀerent
age groups are substitutes for each other, although their marginal productivity is
allowed to diﬀer (for details, see van Ours and Stoeldraijer, 2010). Under these
assumptions, αq may be interpreted as the marginal productivity of labor of the
age-reference worker type, βq as the total labor elasticity of output, and γp
j
the
contribution of labor type j relatively to the baseline category for the ﬁrm’s pro-
ductivity. From the wage equation, parameters γwj also measure the diﬀerential
contribution of labor type j to the ﬁrm’s average hourly wage.
The two equations share the same set of regressors. Vector lj ,it includes the
share of the total number of worker-hours that is accounted for by each type of
labor considered. We deﬁned labor types according to gender (females), highest
level of education achieved (university degree, high school degree, 9, 6 or 4 years
of education), and age (nine categories, deﬁned on a 5-year basis, from 18 to 65
years of age, with the category 35-39 omitted). Vector Xit includes controls for the
ﬁrm age (years since the ﬁrm was created), ﬁrm size (log of the total number of
workers), origin of capital (foreign or public, with private as the omitted category),
industry (20 dummy variables), location (one dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm
is located in the Lisbon area), and time (19 year dummies).
We start by estimating equations (1) and (2) by pooled OLS. Yet, for OLS
9The yearly worker-hours were computed as 12 times the reported monthly hours.
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estimators to remain unbiased it is essential that all the regressors in the two
equations are uncorrelated with the corresponding error term. This is unlikely the
case in the event that ﬁrm-level productivity/wages and the age-structure of its
workforce are jointly determined by an unobserved third factor.10
To address this diﬃculty, we also estimate equations (1) and (2) using a spec-
iﬁcation with ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects (FE). In doing so, we are assuming that the error
terms (εit) in the two equations may be decomposed into a time-invariant unob-
served eﬀect (ai) and an idiosyncratic error term (uit):
εit = ai + uit (3)
Although ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation appropriately solves the heterogeneity bias
(assuming that the omitted regressors are constant over time), it does not handle
the endogeneity bias that will be present if the dependent variables in the two equa-
tions and the age-structure of its workforce are jointly determined such that shocks
aﬀecting productivity and wages also translate into changes in the composition of
the workforce. Positive and negative productivity shocks are expected to lead to
the hiring and ﬁring of workers, with younger workers being over-represented in
both ﬂows. Furthermore, an omitted variables bias will also persist after ﬁxed-
eﬀect estimation if some of the omitted variables are not constant over time.
To account for both sources of endogeneity we also estimate equations (1) and
(2) in ﬁrst-diﬀerences by the generalized method of moments (GMM). All age
shares are instrumented with the corresponding levels lagged two and three peri-
ods (years). The implicit assumption is that productivity shocks in one period,
although possibly correlated with the contemporaneous variations in labor shares,
are uncorrelated with their levels two and three years before.
Hence, our ﬁnal step is to estimate by GMM the two equations:
Δln(ωit) = β
ωΔln(Lit) +
∑
γωj Δlj ,it + δ
ωΔXit + Δε
ω
it, (4)
and
Δln(qit) = β
qΔln(Lit) +
∑
γqjΔlj ,it + δ
qΔXit + Δε
q
it, (5)
using lj ,i(t−s) with s = 2, 3 as instruments for Δlj ,it , with j being equal to all the
age-shares considered.11
10This is specially a concern in our case because, due to data limitations, we do not control for the capital
stock, even though the problem may be mitigated as we include among the regressors the age and size of the ﬁrm
and the industry it belongs to.
11Given the fact that we do not have other instruments available but lagged values of the endogenous variables
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4 Wage and productivity age profiles
Figure 1 and the ﬁrst column in tables 2 and 3 report the results of our basic
speciﬁcation, the OLS model. Although obtained from ﬁrm-level data, the inverted
u-shaped wage-earnings proﬁle is rather similar to the one usually detected in
worker-level wage regressions. Up to the interval between 50 and 54 years of age,
an increase of one percentage point in the share of workers in each age bracket
has an increasingly large impact on the ﬁrm’s average hourly wage. Only for the
top two age brackets (above the age of 55) does that eﬀect decline. The age-
productivity proﬁle also has an inverted u-shaped pattern and reaches its peak
at the 40-44 age range. After that, there is a marked decline, with older workers
experiencing an increasingly smaller contribution to the ﬁrm’s productivity.
Both results are consistent with an human capital interpretation, as they in-
dicate that, up to a certain age, older (more experienced) workers become more
productive and get paid higher wages.
However, if we compare the two proﬁles, we see that the changes in wages asso-
ciated with increasing age are consistently larger than the changes in productivity.
Such a pattern lends support to the existence of a mechanism of deferred com-
pensation over the life-cycle, with worker wages always growing faster than produc-
tivity. For example, with everything else constant, replacing workers aged 35-39
(the reference category) by workers aged 50-54 would lead to a decline in average
productivity of 0.061% per percentage point change, but an increase in average
wages of 0.175%.12
Estimation of the productivity and wage equations by ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects conveys
a fundamentally similar result — see Figure 2 and column 2 in tables 2 and 3—,
even if the wage proﬁle is slightly diﬀerent in the OLS and FE regressions. Once
we control for ﬁrm unobserved time-invariant characteristics, we ﬁnd that larger
shares of older workers are monotonically associated with higher average wages.
The productivity proﬁle indicates declining productivity starting now at age 30.
Compared to the OLS estimates, these results indicate that the share of oldest
workers is indeed larger in low-pay workplaces.
Our preferred speciﬁcation accounts for the possible endogeneity of changes in
the composition of the workforce, via GMM estimation, and the detected patterns
(in levels), we chose to use the minimum number of lags that pass the Hansen test, so as to maximize the number
of observations used in the estimation.
12One percentage point equals 0.01 in the scale of measurement of the shares.
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change slightly (see ﬁgure 3 and column 3 in tables 2 and 3). As expected, the
estimated standard errors are now larger, specially in the case of the productivity
equation. Now, the age-productivity curve is upward sloping throughout most age
ranges and peaks at the 50-54 age bracket. The age-wage proﬁle shows an inverted-
u shaped as in the OLS case.13 However, given the large conﬁdence intervals, we
cannot discard the possibility of a basically ﬂat age-wage proﬁle starting at age
35.
A steep age-productivity proﬁle indicates considerable on-the-job training in
the early years of participation in employment, a fact also noted by Hægeland and
Klette (1999). However, the fact that the age-wage proﬁle becomes less steep than
the age-productivity proﬁle around age 30-34, and essentially ﬂat in the prime-
age range, also indicates that the returns to training are appropriated by workers
earlier on and by employers only subsequently.
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Figure 1: Production and wage cost functions, Ordinary Least Squares estimation,
economy. Source: Computations based on Portugal (1986 to 2008).
We note that our productivity proﬁles are broadly consistent with previous ﬁnd-
ings. Our ﬁnal estimates indicate that workers reach their maximum contribution
to productivity at the age 50-54, a result that conﬁrms Skirbekk’s (2003) estimate
of around 50. This result is also similar to that obtained by Go¨bel and Zwick
(2009).
As in previous studies based on cross-section data and broad age intervals
(Hellerstein and Neumark, 1995, Hellerstein et al.,1999) or short panels (Aubert
and Cre´pon, 2003, Dostie, 2006, van Ours and Stoeldraijer, 2010), our results on
13Note that the more compressed scale in Figure 3 shows an apparently ﬂatter wage proﬁle.
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Figure 2: Production and wage cost functions, Fixed Effects estimation, economy.
Source: Computations based on Portugal (1986 to 2008).
wages also indicate that workers are paid according to their relative contribution
to output, though not over their entire working-life. Productivity increases are
passed on to young workers under the form of higher wages, but not to prime-age
or old workers.
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Figure 3: Production and wage cost functions, General Method of Moments, econ-
omy. Source: Computations based on Portugal (1986 to 2008).
Finally, as a robustness check we re-estimate all our models separately for man-
ufacturing and for services. Results in Figures 4 to 9 in appendix indicate that the
age-wage and age-productivity proﬁles are very similar in the two sub-samples.
The use of a more adequate estimation method (GMM) highlights that the
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OLS FE GMM
(1) (2) (3)
Employment (log) .050 .015 -.004
(.001)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.003)
Age of the firm .0009
(.00008)∗∗∗
Public ownership .079
(.012)∗∗∗
Foreign ownership .165
(.006)∗∗∗
Lisbon .064
(.003)∗∗∗
Share of workers aged 18-24 -.389 -.206 -.398
(.008)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗
Share of workers aged 25-29 -.284 -.100 -.101
(.009)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗
Share of workers aged 30-34 -.106 -.033 -.028
(.008)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.019)
Share of workers aged 40-44 .077 .032 .061
(.008)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗
Share of workers aged 45-49 .145 .062 .026
(.010)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.029)
Share of workers aged 50-54 .175 .074 .032
(.012)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.038)
Share of workers aged 55-59 .142 .118 -.042
(.013)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.047)
Share of workers aged 60-65 .088 .147 -.094
(.018)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.056)∗
Share of workers w/ highest level university degree 1.943 1.049 .875
(.019)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.056)∗∗∗
Share of workers w/ highest level high-school degree .996 .465 .371
(.017)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗ (.052)∗∗∗
Share of workers w/ highest level 9 yrs school .711 .332 .283
(.016)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗ (.050)∗∗∗
Share of workers w/ highest level 6 yrs school .454 .205 .191
(.015)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.048)∗∗∗
Share of workers w/ highest level 4 yrs school .230 .125 .081
(.014)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.044)∗
Share of female workers -.243 -.203 -.198
(.004)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗
Const .604 0.901 .009
(.152)∗∗∗ (.177)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Obs. 301,328 301,328 112,861
R2 .744 .918 .04
F statistic 2,906.4 1,838.1 19.44
Hansen-J statistic 8.936
[0.348]
Table 2: Wage regressions (ordinary least squares, fixed effects, and general
method of moments).
Note: The OLS regression includes controls for the industry (20 dummy variables) and time (19 dummy
variables); the FE regression includes controls for time (19 dummy variables). In the GMM regression,
the equation is estimated in ﬁrst diﬀerences, with the shares of worker ages lagged 2 and 3 periods
used as instruments. Firm-clustered robust standard-errors in parenthesis. P-value in brackets. Source:
Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2008).
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OLS FE GMM
(1) (2) (3)
Employment (log) .001 -.292 -.641
(.005) (.008)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗
Age of the firm .004
(.0003)∗∗∗
Public ownership -.218
(.057)∗∗∗
Foreign ownership .224
(.021)∗∗∗
Lisbon .098
(.010)∗∗∗
Share of workers aged 18-24 -.181 .060 -1.032
(.030)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗ (.122)∗∗∗
Share of workers aged 25-29 -.183 .105 -.658
(.031)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗∗ (.110)∗∗∗
Share of workers aged 30-34 -.060 .090 -.224
(.029)∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗ (.081)∗∗∗
Share of workers aged 40-44 .081 -.086 .221
(.031)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.081)∗∗∗
Share of workers aged 45-49 .044 -.222 0.220
(.037) (.030)∗∗∗ (.113)∗∗
Share of workers aged 50-54 -.061 -.301 .460
(.041) (.035)∗∗∗ (.153)∗∗∗
Share of workers aged 55-59 -.217 -.383 .438
(.049)∗∗∗ (.041)∗∗∗ (.186)∗∗∗
Share of workers aged 60-65 -.544 -.481 .281
(.067)∗∗∗ (.051)∗∗∗ (.218)
Share of workers w/ highest level university degree 2.060 .373 .505
(.076)∗∗∗ (.084)∗∗∗ (.151)∗∗∗
Share of workers w/ highest level high-school degree 1.546 .173 .587
(.071)∗∗∗ (.070)∗∗ (.142)∗∗∗
Share of workers w/ highest level 9 yrs school 1.065 .094 0.487
(.069)∗∗∗ (.065) (.129)∗∗∗
Share of workers w/ highest level 6 yrs school .401 -.125 0.388
(.066)∗∗∗ (.061)∗∗ (.121)∗∗∗
Share of workers w/ highest level 4 yrs school .219 -.138 0.017
(.064)∗∗∗ (.057)∗∗ (.092)
Share of female workers -.689 -.181 .050
(.017)∗∗∗ (.030)∗∗∗ (.041)
Const 3.660 4.558 -.014
(.684)∗∗∗ (.635)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Obs. 301,328 301,328 112,861
R2 .406 .776 .041
F statistic 607.933 102.971 45.09
Hansen-J statistic 14.353
[0.073]
Table 3: Sales regressions (ordinary least squares, fixed effects, and general
method of moments).
Note: The OLS regression includes controls for the industry (20 dummy variables) and time (19 dummy
variables); the FE regression includes controls for time (19 dummy variables). In the GMM regression,
the equation is estimated in ﬁrst diﬀerences, with the shares of worker ages lagged 2 and 3 periods
used as instruments. Firm-clustered robust standard-errors in parenthesis. P-value in brackets. Source:
Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2008).
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decline in workers’ productivity as they grow older is not as marked as more
naive estimation methods would lead us to believe. Overall, the evidence collected
shows that early in the lifecycle both productivity and wages increase at a fast
pace. Productivity goes on increasing steadily into old age, to reach a plateau
between ages 50 and 59, declining afterwards. Note that at the ages 50 to 59,
productivity is larger than at much younger ages, namely at the reference group
35-39. After age 60, the point estimate still suggests a high productivity, even
though we cannot preclude the possibility that it goes back to the levels of the
reference group (see the very wide conﬁdence intervals). On their side, wages reach
a plateau earlier than productivity and even decline at older ages.
Although we cannot extrapolate our results beyond the age of 65, taken at
face value, they would not substantiate concerns over the impact of aging on
productivity or proﬁtability. The same would also apply to the consequences
of extending the compulsory age of retirement that many governments around
the developed world are considering as a means to ease the pressure on their
increasingly burdened retirement pension plans. But, as we said, these implications
would hold only to the extent that productivity does not decrease severely around
the age of 70, which is not what other studies indicate, and would also depend
on which workers (if any) would be left out of employment due to older workers
remaining in employment for longer periods, not to mention that other issues (such
as health status or workers’ well-being) could not be ignored if such a policy change
were to be considered.
5 Conclusion
Using a panel of Portuguese private sector ﬁrms that spans for over 20 years and
includes detailed information on worker and ﬁrm characteristics, we ﬁnd in our
preferred speciﬁcation that the age-productivity proﬁle of the ﬁrm increases with
age and peaks at the age interval between 50-54. Afterwards it remains relatively
constant. In contrast, age-wage proﬁles are remarkably ﬂat after the age interval
between 25-29 and decline above the age interval between 50-54.
Wages and productivity increase at similar paces only in the early years in
employment. From there on productivity continues to increase (due to on-the-
job training investments) whereas wages remain mostly constant. This result is
consistent with shared investments in on-the-job training, whereby workers recover
their investments as their beneﬁts start to emerge and employers receive their share
14
of the return later on.
Finally, our results imply that the answer to our title question is positive: older
workers are worthy of their pay in the sense that their contribution to production
exceeds their contribution to the wage bill.
The comparison between the results of OLS and ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation, on
one hand, and GMM estimation, on the other hand, also indicates that failure to
account for unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity and endogeneity of changes in factor
shares biases the results towards ﬁnding evidence of underpayment followed by
overpayment policies. Non-random distribution of workers of diﬀerent ages across
ﬁrms coupled with selective ﬁring policies, if not properly accounted for, can be
mistaken for older workers being overpaid.
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Figure 4: Production and wage cost functions, Ordinary Least Squares estimation,
manufacturing. Source: Computations based on Portugal (1986 to 2008).
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Figure 5: Production and wage cost functions, Fixed Effects estimation, manufac-
turing. Source: Computations based on Portugal (1986 to 2008).
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Figure 6: Production and wage cost functions, General Method of Moments, man-
ufacturing. Source: Computations based on Portugal (1986 to 2008).
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Figure 7: Production and wage cost functions, Ordinary Least Squares estimation,
services. Source: Computations based on Portugal (1986 to 2008).
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Figure 8: Production and wage cost functions, Fixed Effects estimation, services.
Source: Computations based on Portugal (1986 to 2008).
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Figure 9: Production and wage cost functions, General Method of Moments, ser-
vices. Source: Computations based on Portugal (1986 to 2008).
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